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IIL REFERENCES AND CITATIONS
References and citations in this brief shall have the following abbreviations:
The record of court's file on appeal - AR (Appellate Record)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - URCP, and
Utah Code Annotated- UCA
Exhibits —Ex
Citations to the record will be (AR
)
IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS TO HEAR THIS APPEAL
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal transferred to it by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its transfer authority in Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-2(2)(j).
V. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
AND CITATIONS TO RECORD OF PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion of the defendant, Wardley
Corporation, (hereinafter Wardley) for summary judgment dismissing the claim of the
plaintiff, Cindy L. Young, (hereinafter Young) for breach of contract for the failure to pay her
commissions on $166,000 earned but not paid by the seller, Robert Highsmith, for the sale
of the Chateau Brickyard Senior Retirement Apartments in Salt Lake City? On an appeal
from a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals construes the evidentiary material submitted
on the motion and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion." Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah
App 1993) citing Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1992). The Court
reviews the district court's legal conclusions for correctness. Equitable Life Insurance Co. v.
Ross.
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing the claim

of Young against Wardley for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
connection with the sale? On an appeal from a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals
construes the evidentiary material submitted on the motion and all reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Equitable Life
Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App 1993) citing Thurston v. Box Elder County,
835 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1992). The Court reviews the district court's legal conclusions for
correctness. Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Ross.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in construing the agency employment contract

between Wardley and Young to be unambiguous on its face and to provide that Young only
earned commissions on the $150,000.00 that Wardley was actually paid by the seller and not
on the contract amount? On appeal the courts review construction of statutes as conclusions
of law. They accord the trial court no deference on its conclusion.

VL CONTROLLING STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
A. CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 62-2-18(1) & (2)

B. CONTROLLING RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c)
VEL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF CASE, THE COURSE OF THE
PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
This case involves a contract dispute for failure to pay real estate commissions. This
2

appeal has a unique issue because the payment of fees sought were never collected by
Wardley. Young claims that she earned the full amount of the commission by bringing a
willing, able and ready buyer to the closing table who paid the seller the full contract sales
price of $7,900,000.00, but the seller only paid Wardley at the time of closing $150,000.of
the total of $316,000 commissions due. Young claims Wardley either chose to ignore
protecting and collecting the remaining $166,000 of the commission or was negligent in not
doing so.
Young, as a real estate agent, is precluded by statute from pursuing her claims in court
against anyone other that the principal broker. Young claims that Wardley, as the principal
broker and her employer, breached its contract with her and in addition breached its duty to
her of good faith and fair dealing by failing to safeguard and collect all of the commissions
while the sales proceeds were in escrow and before disposition of any of those funds.
Young claims that Wardley also breached the employment contract and its duty to her
of good faith and fair dealing by failing to take sufficient and required steps necessary after
the disposition of the funds to recover the balance of the commission through litigation.
Wardley obtained a default judgment against the seller who turned out to be insolvent, but
failed to pursue the buyer who had ownership possession of the subject real property and who
was in collusion with the seller in withholding the major portion of the commissions. Young
also claims Wardley should have pursued the escrow agent who had a fiduciary duty to
safeguard those funds until any commission dispute was resolved, or at the very least,
instructed the escrow agent to hold the proceeds in escrow pending resolution of the dispute.
3

In addition, notwithstanding Wardley did not collect the full commissions due, Young claims
that Wardley was responsible to pay her the unpaid portion of her commissions under its
employment contract with her, since she had fully performed her duty and services to
Wardley under that contract. For failing to do so, Wardley breached its contract with her.
Finally, Young claims the trial judge incorrectly construed the contract(s) between her
and Wardley in holding that the contract terms were unambiguous and that she only "earned5'
her portion of the commissions actually paid to Wardley by the seller.
The Order of the trial court granting Wardley summary judgment dismissing Young's
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was granted on March 9,2004
(AR 534-535). The Order of the trial court granting Wardley summary judgment dismissing
Young's claim for breach of contract was entered on November 2, 2004. (AR 805-807)
B(l) STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On July 1, 1996, the purchaser closed the purchase of the Chateau Brickyard

Retirement Apartments in Salt Lake City, hereinafter "Chateau Apartments", at a sales price
of $7,900,000.00. (Young Aff, AR 624) Young, representing Wardley as its real estate agent,
was present at the office of Associated Title Company, the escrow closing agent, at the time.
The seller was present on the telephone. However, since the closing documents had to be
delivered to the out of state seller for signatures, the closing was not completed until several
days later.
2.

The real estate commission rate for the sale was four percent (4%) or the sales

price and amounted to $316,000.00. (Id ) Young, on behalf of Wardley, entered into a Single
4

Party Listing and Agency Agreement with Robert Highsmith, general partner of the seller,
Salt Lake Chateau Brickyard Associates, a California Limited PartnersMp,(hereinafter seller)
on August 16, 1995. That listing agreement set the commission rate and was never revoked
or amended. (AR 560. of Young Aft AR 622-624 Exhibit B, AR 633-635 )
3.

In collusion with the purchaser to cut Wardley's real estate commissions, the

seller instructed the escrow agent to pay Wardley real estate commissions of only
$150,000.00. The remaining portion of the commissions, $166,000.00, was divided between
the seller and the buyer. (Young Aff., AR, 626,)
4.

At the time of the closing, Young, on behalf of Wardley, refused the sellers

demand to reduce the commission, but did not take any action, including judicial action, to
protect them by preventing the escrow agent from paying the unpaid portion to the seller and
the buyer. (Id.)
5.

After the sale had closed, Wardley brought suit against the seller for breach of

contract and obtained a default judgment. However, Wardley learned that the seller was
financially insolvent and judgment proof and did not take make any further attempts to collect
the judgment. (Wardley Aff., AR, 153-154 & Exhibit K, AR, 190-195)
6.

Wardley refused to sue the purchaser for interference with contractual relations

and the escrow agent for breach of a fiduciary duty. (Young Aff., AR 306-309 & Exhibits F,
G,H,I,J)
7.

Wardley refused to pay Young her share of the earned $166,000 unpaid or

uncollected portion of the commission. (AR 21, ^[18, 135-136, 410-411)
5

8.

Young brought the instant litigation in December 1999 based upon her contract

with Wardley and the Utah Code which requires her to look to her principal broker for her
commissions and prevents herfrompursuing litigation against anyone but the principal broker
to recover her commissions. (AR 1-17 & UCA § 61-2-18)
9.

After the case had been stalled in discovery for three and one half years,

Wardley moved for summary judgment arguing that it had performed all that it was
reasonably required to do and Young's complaint should be dismissed. (AR 141)
10.

The Court denied Wardley's motion to dismiss Young's claim for breach of

contract but granted in part Wardley's motion by dismissing Young's claim of Wardley's
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (AR 534-535)
11. Subsequently, Young filed a motion and memorandum seeking partial summary
judgment that she was entitled to her share of the full earned commissions of $316,000.00.
(A.R. 556-573) In its response, Wardley renewed its motion for summary judgment for a
dismissal of Young's claim for breach of contract related to its failure to pay her commission
on the unpaid or uncollected part ($166,000.00) of the total commissions.
12.

The Court heard and denied Young's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

August 6, 2004.1 (AR 769-771)
13.

The Court ruled on Wardley' s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

1

During the course of the proceedings on summary judgment, Young amended the
complaint with leave of the court and raised claims that Wardley failed to pay her all of the
commission to which she was entitledfromthe $150,00 actually paid to Wardley. She received a
jury verdict and a judgment in her favor on that claim on November 17, 2006.
6

on November 2, 2006. (AR 800-807) In reaching the ruling, the Court considered only the
language within the four corners of the employment agreement and held that it imambiguously
provided that Young "earned" only a percentage of the commission actually paid; in the
words of the Court, the calculation of commissions is based upon the "actual amount that the
property yielded and not on an assumed amount." (AR 800)
14.

Young entered into her employment contract with Wardley on April 30, 1992

styled as a "Broker Sales Executive Contract Independent Contractor Agreement" (AR 400404, Exhibit N to Affidavit of Cindy L. Thompson, plaintiff)
15.

Paragraph 7 of Young's employment contract with Wardley, entered into on

April 30, 1992, provides in pertinent part:
. . The commissions and fees for services rendered on the sale, rental,
trade or lease of real estate shall be those set forth on the "Listing Commission
Schedule", shown on page 3. . . (Id.)
16.

Paragraph 8 of the contract provides in pertinent part:

. . . Division and payment of commissions, fees and commission bonuses
shall be in accordance with the Broker's Annual Graduated Commission Schedule
for Realtors' attached hereto and incorporated herein on page 4. Division and
distribution of earned commissions shall take place as soon as practical after
collection of such commissions from the party or parties for whom the services
have been performed...
The division of "earned commissions" referred to in that paragraph is between the
broker and the sales agent(s). (Id)
17.

The Annual Graduated Commission Schedule For Realtors provides in

pertinent part:

In House
Commission
7

Crossboard
Commission

Step 5

$50,000 and Above

80%.

66.66%

"In House Commission"is based upon the Sales Executive listing and selling
a Wardley Better Homes and Gardens property (both legs of the transaction).
Sales Executives receive the percentage shown of the total commission received
by the Broker
(Id)
18..

Young was to be paid her earned commission based upon a graduated scale as

soon as practical after the collection of the commission from the seller. According to the
graduated scale, the agent(s) were entitled to eighty percent of the commission earned.2
B(2) STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
In her Responses to Wardley's motions for summary judgment and partial summary
judgment, Young disputed the following very basic and material facts.
19.

Wardley claimed that it had paid Young $56,400 commissions on the Chateau

Brickyard sale and that was all to which she was entitled.
20.

Wardley claimed that it had done all that it could reasonably be expected to do

to collect and/or recover the remaining balance of the commission due and unpaid which
amounted to $166,000. This last fact statement has many different subordinate facts that are
material and which needed to be ferreted out by discovery and presented at trial such as:
(a)

Did Wardley, apart from Cindy Young, object to the seller's unilateral

changing of the commission amount at closing?

2

Young had engaged in an agreement with another agent for Wardley by which that
agent and Young would split equally the amount of the commissions. A dispute arose in the case
before trial whether Young was entitled to the full amount of the agent's commission. However,
that issue is not relevant to this appeal.
8

(b) Did Wardley's officers or brokers do anything or make any demand upon
Associated Title Company, the escrow agent, to hold the full amount of the
commissions in escrow until a resolution of the commission dispute was
resolved?
(c) Did Wardley consult its legal counsel at the time of the closing about what
it should do before the sales proceeds were dispersed by Associated Title
Company?
(d) What, if any other steps, did Wardley take or fail to take in order to
safeguard the commission while the sales proceeds were in escrow and after?
VHL SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing Young's claim for her
proportionate share of the unpaid real estate commissions upon a construction of the
Employment Contract between Young and Wardley. The Court erred in holding that ^ 8 of
the contract limited Young's "earned commissions55 to her proportionate share of the
commissions which Wardley received at the time of closing. The court below also erred in
concluding that the definition of "In House Commissions55, on page 4 of the employment
agreement, limited the earned commissions to Young to be her percentage of the amount of
commissions actually received by Wardley.
The meaning the trial court gave those provisions is a strained construction. A plain

reading of both provisions in context shows that the expressions used were used for different
purposes than given by the court. The phrase "earned commissions" in paragraph 8 is
merely used to provide when those commissions are to be paid and not to limit the amount
of the commissions earned. The definition of "IN HOUSE COMMISSION" merely provides
how the commissions will be divided when they are received. It does not define or limit the
amount of those commissions that the agent (in this case Young) has earned.
B. WARDLEY OWED A CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO SAFEGUARD AND TAKE
ALL REASONABLE STEPS TO COLLECT AND PAY YOUNG HER SHARE
OF THE FULL COMMISSIONS
Wardley owed a contractual duty to Young to safeguard the earned real estate
commission ($316,000.) while it was in the possession and custody of the escrow agent and
to take reasonable and adequate steps to collect the full commission after the seller, through
the escrow agent, spirited away the major portion of those funds, $166,000 by dispersing
them to the seller and the buyer contrary to the listing agreement that the seller had made with
Wardley before it even entered into the real estate purchase agreement with the buyer and
before the closing of the sale took place. Wardley breached this contractual duty to Young
by not taking diligent steps to prevent the unlawful dispersion of the $166,000 and by later
not taking reasonable and adequate steps to recover and pay Young her share of the money.
C. PAYMENT OF COMMISSIONS UNDER THOMPSON'S EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT WITH WARDLEY IS NOT CONDITIONAL UPON COLLECTION
FROM A THIRD PARTY
Nothing in the employment contract that Young had with Wardley expressly provides
that Young's right to be paid her commission is conditioned upon the payment of the
10

commissions by a third party, in this case the seller of the Chateau Brickyard Apartments.
In addition to her relationship to Wardley as its agent, Young and Wardley had an
employer/employee relationship. The only thing that was expressly contingent or conditional
about Young being paid her real estate commissions under the employment contract with
Wardley was her performance. She fully performed her duty to Wardley. Wardley did not
fully perform on its duty to Young.
Young was not a guarantor of the performance of the buyer or seller, nor was she a
guarantor of the performance of Wardley as the principal broker. Under Utah law, Young
could not pursue the seller, buyer or escrow agent to recover her commission. She could only
pursue her principal broker. (UCA 62-2-18) Wardley, as her broker and as the principal
broker, did nothing to safeguard the sales proceeds in escrow sufficient enough to pay those
commissions and did not take reasonable and adequate steps to collect them after dispersal
of the sales proceeds. This was Wardley's own voluntary decision. That fact does not
excuse Wardley from liability to pay Young her share of the full commissions earned.
D* THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS LEFT TO BE TRIED
IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUES OF WARDLEY'S FAILURE TO PAY
YOUNG HER COMMISSIONS
In denying Young's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court noted there
were questions about whether she had been paid her real estate commissions, if so how much
had been paid and whether another agent was entitled to a share of the commissions, all of
which warranted the denial of her motion. There are also disputes of material facts as to
whether Wardley should have paid Young her share of the full real estate commission earned
11

and whether Wardley conducted itself in good faith and fairly attempted to preserve the
commissions while the sales proceeds were in escrow at closing and whether Wardley took
reasonable steps and diligently pursued collection of the full amount of the commissions after
the proceeds were dispersed.

The evidentiary answers to these questions will determine

whether Wardley has breached its contractual duty to Young and whether it has also breached
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to Young. The case should be
remanded to examine the evidence of these disputed issues of fact.
E. AS CONSTRUED BY THE TRIAL COURT THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
IS AMBIGUOUS. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.
Young contends that the trial judge erred in construing the provisions of the
employment contract betweenher and Wardley by concluding that the contract defined earned
commissions as those actually paid to Wardley by the seller. A contract is ambiguous if there
are two or more plausible constructions. If the construction given the contract by the trial
judge is plausible, the contract is ambiguous. In that event the case should be remanded to
the trial court to take extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties at the time they entered
into the contract.
IX. ARGUMENT
Summary judgment shall only be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Utah Rules of civil Procedure 56(c). Evidence in opposition to the motion
12

must reasonably support a finding in their favor on a material issue of fact. Billings v. Union
Bankers Ins. Co., 819p2d803 (Utah 1991). Summaryjudgment is appropriate when it clearly
appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail.
Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P2d 64 (Utah 1984).
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment on appeal, the appellate court views all
evidence presented by pleadings, affidavits and depositions, if any, together with all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the opposing party.
The court reviews legal conclusions for correctness affording the trial court no discretion.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187
(Utah App 1993); Gate City Federal Savings And Loan Association v. Dalton, 808 P.2d 1117,
157Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1991).Madison v. Deseret Land and Livestock, 574F.2d
1027 (10* Cir. 1978).
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
In the final analysis, the trial court below determined that the issue of whether Young
was entitled to a commission on the $ 166,000 unpaid portion of the commission that the seller
did not pay Wardley as a matter of law by interpreting the terms of the employment
agreement between the parties. The honorable Judge ruled that the provision in % 8 of the
contract which states: "Division and distribution of earned commissions shall take place as
soon as practical after collection of such commissions from the party or parties for whom the
services have been performed.5' was definitive. The Court ruled that the contract as a whole
13

was clear and unambiguous and that the " term 'earned' indicates that Ms. Young's
commission calculation is based upon the actual amount that the property yielded and not on
an assumed amount." (AR 800) In other words, under the Judge's interpretation, the "earned
commission was not to be determined by the agreed upon sales commission rate of 4 % of
the sales price of the property as contracted in the Listing Agreement..
The Judge's construction overlooks the fact that the provision quoted from % 8 is a
provision that provided when the commission is to be paid and not how much Young is to
receive. The subject of that sentence is the time of the division of commissions, not the
amount that is collected. The clear purpose of that sentence is to provide that the division
of commissions take place "as soon as is practical" after the commission is paid to the broker.
In its context it is not intended to provide that the amount of the commission earned is only
the amount that is collected. The words "earned commission" and " as soon as practical after
collection" are merely used to express the time the "earned commissions" are to be divided
between Wardley and Young and not to limit the amount of the commissions earned to the
amount that is collected.
The amount of the commission earned is a matter of contract and in this case it is clear
that rate was 4% of the purchase price of $7,900,000.00 which is $316,000.00. The amount
of the commission "earned" by Young was her percentage of the $316,000, regardless of the
amount collected.. See Robert Langston, LTD., v. L. Gurr McQuarrie 741 P.2d 554 (Utah
1987). Also, Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2, 746, 751 (Utah 1983). The
commission is not earned when the commission is paid or collected., but upon the procuring
14

of a buyer who is ready, willing and able and who is acceptable to the seller. (Id.)
The same reasoning applies in the construction of the provision defining "In House
Commission" on page 4 of the contract. The honorable Trial Judge ruled that the expression,
"receive the percentage shown of the total commission received by the broker" further
indicates that the agent's ("Sales Executive") earned commission is only the percentage of the
total commission received by the broker.

Again, the expression quoted is only used to

illustrate the percentage of the commission which the sales agent is to receive. Those words
were used to show how the total commission is to be divided, not to limit the amount of the
commission earned on the sale to that which is actually received by the broker.
In this case the earned amount of the commission included the amount not paid and
for which Wardley sued the seller and obtained a default judgment. (Wardley Aff. AR 153,
1f 16 & 17, Exhibit J, AR 185-188) Otherwise, Wardley's case against the seller would have
been without merit.(Id.)
There is simply no clause or provision in the employment agreement between Wardley
and Young which is designed for the purpose of defining or limiting the amount of
commissions earned to the amount received by Wardley.

The amount of the earned

commissions is derived from other contractual documents, in this case from the Single
Agency Listing Agreement.

The Honorable Judge erred in her construction of the

employment contract.
The issues in this case do not turn solely on the how much of the commission was
paid, but also the lack of diligence of the broker in failing to safeguard and collect the
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commission. The grant of summary judgment should be overturned and remanded back to
the district court for an evidentiary determination of the latter issue.
Young's position is supported by other cases in Utah and at least one other state. In
Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292, 2004 UT 54
(Ut. App. 2003)RobertLangston, LTD., v. L GurrMcQuarrie 741 P.2d at 558 n.7, (refusing
to condition commission on parties' performance where contract did not contain conditional
language); and, Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983) (refusing to
adopt minority rule, which conditions commission on parties' performance if contract does
not expressly condition liability for commission); The Utah Court of Appeals held in the
Fairbourn case that the real estate broker, "by procuring and presenting to real estate
developer an offer to buy developer's real property, performed its contractual duties under
terms of listing agreement, and was thus deserving of commission..." The listing agreement
in Fairbourn provided that the commission was due and payable at closing. In that case the
closing never took place and the defendant argued that the broker was not entitled to a
commission under the contract. The Court in Fairbourn held that the expression or term in
the Listing Agreement, "due and payable at closing", only fixed the time of payment of the
commission and not whether the broker was entitled to, or had earned a commission.
In the Langston case, supra, the plaintiff real estate broker brought a buyer to the seller
of cattle and range land grazing permits. After the parties entered into an agreement, and
partially performed, a dispute arose between the parties which resulted in the trial court
ordering a recission of the contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's recission
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of the contract, but reversed the ruling below on the real estate commission. The Court held
that the real estate broker was entitled to his commission even though the contract between
the parties fell apart and was rescinded, because the realtor provided the seller with a ready
willing and able buyer.
In the Bushnell case, supra, p. 13, the seller failed to pay the balance due on the real
estate commission when the buyer stopped making payments on a real estate purchase
contract. The Supreme Court of Utah held that the realtor had earned his commission when
he provided a ready, willing and able buyer acceptable to the seller and was not a guarantor
of full payment by the buyer.
While the broker is the party recovering in the above cited cases, the relationship of
Young as agent to Wardley as broker is similar, if not identical, to the relationship between
the realtor and the person obligated to pay the fee. This is because under Utah law an agent
cannot bring an action to collect a real estate commission against the seller or other person.
The agent can only pursue their principal broker on the transaction. UCA § 62-2 18 (1953
as amended)
B. WARDLEY OWED A CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO SAFEGUARD
AND TAKE ALL REASONABLE STEPS TO COLLECT AND
PAY YOUNG HER SHARE OF THE FULL COMMISSIONS
During the times relevant to the sale of the Chateau Apartments for the seller, Young's
relationship to Wardley was that of an employee to an employer. Wardley Better Homes and
Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 1017, 458 Utah Adv, Rep. 15 (Utah 2002), (holding that
in Utah the relationship between a real estate agent and its broker is that of employer and
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employee). See also White v. Fox, 665 P. 2d 1297, 1301, (Utah 1983); Phillips v. JCMDev.
Corp., 666 P.2d 876 881 (Utah 1983). Thus, while the Agency Agreement uses the
description of independent contractor in two of its paragraphs, 1 and 15, the relationship of
Wardley to plaintiff was that of her employer as a matter of law. The payment of an
employee, by their employer for their labor and services, is normally dependent only upon
the employee performing or completing the work which they're hired to do. Once the
employee has performed or completed the work, the employer is obligated to pay them as
agreed.
Wardley earned and was entitled to a 4% commission ($316,000.00) on the sales price
of $7,900,000.00. Thus, as an employee, plaintiff earned a commission on her share of the
$316,000.00 to be paid her by Wardley. The Employment Agreement obligates Wardley to
pay plaintiff her share of the $316,000.00 commissions, which the Listing Agreement,
together with the Employment Agreement, provided and which plaintiff earned at the time she
provided Seller with a ready, willing, and able Buyer.
C. YOUNG'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH WARDLEY IS
NOT CONDITIONAL UPON COLLECTION OF THE COMMISSION.
There is no express condition or contingency in Young's employment contract with
Wardley to her being paid her real estate commission, except Young's performance. Young
performed splendidly in representing Wardley in connection with both sides or legs of the
transaction, both the sale and purchase. Yet, Wardley has repudiated its obligation to the
plaintiff by refusing to pay her the full share of her earned commission. Wardley attempted
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to escape its obligation to pay plaintiff her earned commission by rationalizing in previous
pleadings before the trial court that, "the seller breached its agreement by failing to pay
Wardley its 4%" ; "Wardley acquired a default judgment against the seller in two states and
found the seller to be insolvent3"; "Wardley has the right (under the contract) to refuse to
make any effort to collect commission"; and, "Wardley has the sole discretion to collect
commissions owed to it by third parties".
Wardley has made these arguments as though it is relieved of its obligation to pay
plaintiff her earned commission. However, Young fully performed and met her obligations
under the employment agreement. Wardley failed to perform and complete its duty. Young's
right to be paid was not contingent upon the seller's payment of the obligation to Wardley,
it was only conditioned upon her bringing a ready, willing and able buyer who was acceptable
to the seller. Thompson's employment agreement with Wardley was not a "conditional
contract". Fairbourn Commercial, Inc., v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 68 P.3d 1038
(Utah App. 2003); RobertLangston, LTD., v. L. GurrMcQuarrie 741 P.2d at 558 n.7, supra,
p. 6, (refusing to condition the commission on the parties' performance where contract did
not contain conditional language); and, Fairbourn Commercial, Inc., v. American Housing
Partners, Inc., 68 P.3d 1038 (Utah App. 2003), supra, p. 6, (refusing to adopt minority rule,

3

Wardley's statement in pervious pleadings that it acquired a judgment in two states is a
little euphemistic. It obtained a judgment by default in Utah by doing no more than having its
attorneyfilea complaint and take a default when the seller did not answer. It then registered the
judgment in California, the second state, and then had an asset search performed. It did nothing
more after it learned of thefinancialcondition of the sellerfromthe asset search.
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which conditions commission on a party's performance if the contract does not expressly
condition liability for commission the party's performance)
kiBushnell, supra p. 13, the Court stated that "absent a contractual provision, which
conditions the right to a commission on the performance of the buyer, the general rule
accepted in Utah is that a broker has earned his commission upon the procuring of a buyer
who is ready, willing and able and who is accepted by the seller. The broker is not an insurer
of the subsequent performance of the contract and is not deprived of his right to a commission
by the failure or refusal of the buyer to perform." (citation omitted) Young should not be
held to be an insurer of the collection of the commission by Wardley.
Similarly, in Fairbourn, the Utah Court of Appeals considered the claims by a real
estate broker against a real estate developer to recover sales commission from the sale of real
property. The Court affirmed judgment in favor of the real estate broker and held that the real
estate broker, "by procuring and presenting to real estate developer an offer to buy
developer's real property, performed its contractual duties under terms of listing agreement
and was thus deserving of its commission..."

In this case, the Employment Agreement

provides in paragraph 8 that commissions shall be those set forth in the "Annual Graduated
Schedule For Realtors" which is on page 4 of the Agreement following the signatures of the
parties to the contract. Paragraph 8 also states that, "earned commission will be paid as soon
as practical after collection". This provision provides when the commission will be paid, not
whether or not it will be paid. The "In House Commission" definition on page 4 merely
describes how the commissions will be apportioned. Taken together, those provisions do not
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provide that the portion that is received is all that the agent will receive, but when it is paid
and how what is paid at a given time will be apportioned. Nothing in paragraph 8, or the
"Annual Graduated Schedule For Realtors", provides or states that Thompson's commission
is conditional and will be paid only, unless, until, or if, collected. Fairbourn and Bushnell,
supra.

Thompson's employment contract with Wardley does not contain language that

conditions her right to a commission on the collection of a commission from a third party.
Plaintiff has found no Utah real estate cases directly in point. The Michigan Court of
Appeals, in a very similar case, construed a provision similar to that of paragraph 8 of
plaintiff's employment agreement with Wardley. That contract provided, "to pay the
salesman a commission in accordance with the rate schedule below, immediately after
consummation of any sale as soon as such commission has been collected by the broker." In
construing that provision the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that:
"While this provision specifies the time when a broker is required to pay an earned
commission to a salesman, we do not construe it to allow the broker to deny recovery
of a commission that has been earned by a salesman under his employment contract.
Where, as here, the broker either by choice fails to collect his commission or, through
his own fault accepts a listing agreement contrary to the employment contract, the
salesman is not denied the right to recover his commission." Abraham v. Neller,
172 N.S. 2d 817, 819 (Michigan App. Div. 2, 1969)
While the Michigan case is not controlling or authoritative for Utah courts it is persuasive and
very much on point.
Where provisions of the agency contract (Employment Agreement here) are
construed to specify only the time when compensation is to be paid to the agent,
the principal is not entitled to deny a recovery of commissions by either failing to
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collect the sum owed him or her by the customer or by accepting a listing agreement
for the property, which is the subject matter of the agency, under which the principal
loses the right to demand such payment. 24 C.IS. Agency § 315
While Wardley may argue that it did not lose its right to demand payment in this case,
it either voluntarily or negligently allowed the seller and the buyer to trample on that right and
did not exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to enforce it. The effect is the same.
In Reed v. Union Cent Life Ins. 61 P. 21 (Utah 1900), the court considered claims by
a sales agent against his principal, an insurance company, for earned commissions. The court
held that "the defendant company having placed beyond its power the right to collect certain
premium notes in which plaintiff had an interest, as for commission, was estopped from
denying liability for commission earned upon the ground that the maker of the notes was
insolvent and the notes uncollectible. The court held that "a principal who agrees that his
agent shall receive a percentage of money or commissions to be paid upon a contract secured
through such agent, for the benefit of both, cannot dispose of his own right to receive the fund,
and thus deprive the agent of the rewards for his service. Otherwise, the principal might
receive a full equivalent for the original fruits of the agent's labor, and yet not pay him a
dollar. The principal cannot do this without the agent's express consent..." Also see Sterling
B. Cannon v. Stevens School of Business. Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977) (a person cannot
avoid liability for the non-performance of its obligation by placing such performance beyond
his control by his own voluntary act.)
In the present case, Young's employment agreement has no express contractual
provision which conditions her right to a commission from Wardley on the performance or part
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performance of another party. Just as a broker is not an insurer of the performance of a buyer
or another third party, she is not an insurer of the subsequent performance of the Seller or, for
that matter, of the broker, Wardley. She is not deprived of her right to her full share of
commission from Wardley by the failure or refusal of the Seller, or anyone else, to perform
and is not deprived of her right to her commission because of Wardley's failure to collect the
full commission. She is entitled to have Wardley pay her share of the entire $316,000.00
commission which she earned. Further, on the one hand, Young provided Wardley and the
buyer and seller with valuable and quahty service. She prepared and delivered all required
documents to both parties and did everything she could to facilitate the consummation of the
purchase and sale.
On the other hand, the evidence shows that Wardley did practically nothing but sit by
and watch the seller and the buyer spirit away $ 166,000 and divide it between themselves with
impunity. It appears from the evidence that Wardley did not demand that the escrow agent
hold out from distribution, sufficient funds to cover the full commission or demand that the
escrow officer inter- plead the funds, or even attempt to obtain a restraining order to freeze the
funds in the account pending resolution of any claim.
Moreover, after the funds were dispersed, Wardley only brought suit against the seller
and obtained a default judgment that cannot be collected, notwithstanding it had been advised
by two different experienced attorney's, from two reputable law firms, that it had good causes
of action against the buyer and the escrow agent. (Young Aff, AR 624-626 and relevant
exhibits attached thereto). It declined to bring suit against the buyer who was in collusion with
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the seller in cutting the amount of the commission to $150,000, less than one half of the total
amount due.
Young averred in her affidavit that she heard the buyer on the telephone tell the seller
at the closing, they could take money out of "Cindy" s commission. The buyer well knew that
Wardley had a listing contract with the seller. It was a clear case of interference with
contractual relations.(Young Aff. AR 626) Wardley, who touts the fact that it sued the seller
and obtained a default judgment, refused to sue the buyer, who was in collusion with the seller
in changing Wardley's commission and who was now in possession of the same real property
which he purchased from the seller in the transaction. (Young Aff. Exhibits D, E & F, AR 627646)
Also, Wardley refused to sue the escrow agent who had a fiduciary duty to hold the
commission is escrow for Wardley because it had a friendly business relationship with
Associated Title Company who handled the closing. (Young Aff. AR 626627 and Above cited
Exhibits)
D. THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
LEFT TO BE TRIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUES OF
WARDLEY'S FAILURE TO PAY YOUNG HER COMMISSIONS
In denying Young's motion for summary judgment the trial court noted there were
disputed issues of fact concerning the claims of Young to a share of the commissions. It is
also clear from the foregoing that there are disputed issues of fact about whether Wardley had
paid Young and whether Young was entitled to all of the agent's commission on the sale.
There are also substantial questions and disputes of fact, over what Wardley did at the time
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of closing, and after, and whether Wardley discharged or breached its contractual duty to
Young.

There are also facts which came out at trial that support Young's position that

Wardley owed her an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The trial court erred in dismissing Young's complaint for breach of contract and for
breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. When all of the affidavits, pleadings
and depositions submitted by Wardley in support and by Young in opposition are considered
in a light most favorable to Young, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, there are disputed issues of fact and Wardley is not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The grants of summary judgment of both of the trial court's orders should be reversed
and the case remanded to the district court for the taking of evidence at trial or other
appropriate evidentiary hearing.
E. AS CONSTRUED BY THE TRIAL COURT THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS- THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.
A contract is ambiguous when it may be given two plausible interpretations. Fairhourn
Commercial Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292, 2004 UT 54 Young
contends that the contract is not ambiguous, but that the trial judge simply erred in construing
it. However, if this Courtfindsthat the construction of the trial court is plausible, the contract
is ambiguous and should be remanded to the trial court for the taking of extrinsic evidence of
the intentions of the parties in entering into the contract. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers
Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utahl995) Fairhourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing
Partners, Inc., Supra. In the Intermountain Farmers Association case, the Utah Supreme
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Court applied in Utah, for thefirsttime, the rule that where a contract is ambiguous the trial
court must consider extrinsic evidence ("any credible evidence") of the intent of the parties in
entering in to the contract.
X. CONCLUSION
The trial court below erred in construing the employment contract between Wardley and
Young to limit Young's earned real estate commission to her share of the commission actually
paid by the seller and not the amount of the commission to which she was entitled under the
listing agreement for procuring a ready, willing and able buyer, who was acceptable to the
seller. The court below erred in concluding as a matter of law that Young could not recover
her share of the unpaid commissionfromWardley.
Young fully performed under the employment contract. Wardley failed to perform by
failing to discharge its duty to collect the commission at closing or recover it after closing.
There are disputes as to substantial and material issues of fact. When all of the evidence
presented in favor and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, together with all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, is viewed in a light most favorable to Young,
Wardley is not entitled to summary judgment.
This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court granting Wardley Summary
Judgment below in all respects and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings.

orE&int
)elano S. Findlay Attorney for
l^lfintiff/Appellant
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APPENDIX
1. STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated § 62-2-18. Actions for recovery of compensation restricted
(1) No persona may bring or maintain an action in any court of this state for
the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any act done or service
rendered which is prohibited this chapter to other than licensed principal brokers,
unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker at the time of doing the
act or rendering the service.
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the
recovery If a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or
associate broker unless the action is against the principal broker with whom he is
licensed. Any action for recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation
may only be commenced and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales
agent or associate broker is affiliated.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appealsfromthe Supreme Court.
2. RULES AND REGULATIONS:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56 (copy attached)
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